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REMOVING JUROR BIAS BY APPLYING
PSYCHOLOGY TO CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
Arthur H. Patterson, Ph.D. and Nancy L. Neufer, M.S. t
INTRODUCTION
Recent attention has been focused on the use of peremptory chal-
lenges in both civil and criminal litigation.' Much of this attention was
triggered by Batson v. Kentucky,2 and a concern that the use of poten-
tially discriminatory peremptory challenges could influence the composi-
tion of, and thus the fairness of, seated juries. Interest in the impact of
peremptory challenges on the impartiality of juries has also been height-
ened by increasing concern about the role of jury consultants 3 and the
possibility that these consultants can assist trial counsel by actually creat-
ing biased juries.
4
I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AS AN
INSUFFICIENT METHOD
Although primary focus on the use of peremptory challenges has
been during the voir dire process of jury selection, we believe that this
attention is misplaced in an effort to ensure that the jury selection process
results in truly fair and impartial juries.5 Rather, a challenge for cause is
a more appropriate method for minimizing or preventing biased individu-
als from being seated for jury duty.
The extensive procedures taken to ensure that fair juries sit for trial
is instrumental to justice and the appearance of justice in our trial system.
However, the importance of each member of a jury being impartial is
t The authors are jury consultants with FrI Corporation, State College, Pennsylvania.
Dr. Patterson received his Ph.D. in psychology from Northwestern University, and was for-
merly a member of The Administration of Justice Faculty of Pennsylvania State University.
Ms. Neufer received her M.S. in psychology from Pennsylvania State University.
1 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Scientific Jury Selection And The Equal Protection Rights of
Venire Persons, 24 PAc. L.J 1498 (1993).
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
3 See STarN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRiAL AND ERROR IN THE AFmRIcAN COURTROOM
114 (1994).
4 See generally Rachlinski, supra note 1.
5 It is interesting to note that neither Stephen Adler nor Jeffery Rachlinski (nor any other
authors) have, despite extensive discussions of the role of jury consultants, demonstrated that
such consultants have any real impact on the fairness of impaneled juries. The reason for this
is that the value of jury consultants for jury selection is to aid in identifying potentially biased
jurors, and to assist in implementing the "de-selection" procedure which actually occurs injury
selection to remove unfair jurors.
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highlighted by the psychological research that demonstrates that when
groups, such as juries, are used to make judgments, their level of per-
formance typically does not rise to some higher level.6 Rather, on diffi-
cult tasks where the solutions are not easily discernible, groups typically
perform at the level of their average members.7 Thus, the seating of a
potentially biased juror raises grave implications for the fairness of a jury
trial.
Psychologists have long studied how "information-processing" 8 and
"decision-making are influenced by cognitive processes."9 Strong re-
search support for the concept that bias will result from a juror's preex-
isting attitude exists in the literature of social psychology. For example,
Lee Ross studied social perception and found that people persevere in
their initial attitudes, even in the face of contradictory evidence. 10
Charles Lord and his associates studied the effects of prior theories
on subsequently considered evidence and found that people who enter a
situation with a prior attitude will interpret new information so as to
strengthen that attitude." It is important to note that even contradictory
information will be interpreted to support one's prior attitude. 12 Simi-
larly, Peter Ditto and David Lopez found that information consistent with
a preferred conclusion is examined less critically than is information in-
consistent with a preferred conclusion. 13 Consequently, less information
is needed to reach a preferred conclusion. 14
Extensive evidence that pre-trial attitudes will impact jurors' ver-
dicts can be found in the research on the impact of pre-trial publicity.
For example, John Carroll reviewed actual cases and experimental stud-
ies and consistently found an effect of publicity on jurors' verdicts. 15
6 See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judg-
ments, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 163 (1997).
7 See id. at 166.
8 See ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, PSYCHOLOGY OF ATrrruDEs 260-61 (1993).
9 See id. at 476.
10 Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased At-
tributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 880,
889 (1975).
11 Charles Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALrrY' & SOC. PSYCHOL.
2098 (1979).
12 See id. at 2108.
13 Peter Ditto & David Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Crite-
ria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 568
(1982).
14 See id. at 572.
15 John Carroll et al., Free Press and Fair Trial: The Role of Behavioral Research, 10
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 191 (1986).
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This phenomenon has been long recognized 16 and studied in both actual
trials and laboratory research.
17
It is not surprising that attitudes affect behavior.' 8 What is surpris-
ing is the relative lack of effort by judges and trial litigators to use chal-
lenges for cause to remove prospective jurors holding potentially biasing
attitudes from jury panels. While attention is focused on peremptory
challenges, which are limited in some cases to as few as three per
party, 19 jurors holding prejudicial attitudes are allowed to remain in the
array, and eventually to be seated if the number of peremptory challenges
is not sufficient to remove all of the biased jurors.
Such jurors remain eligible to sit on the impaneled jury by simply
stating to the court that, despite having expressed prejudicial attitudes, or
having had experiences highly likely to give rise to such attitudes, that
they can be fair and impartial. 20 It is readily observable that people hold-
ing potentially prejudicial attitudes are regularly seated as jurors in civil
and criminal trials. For example, the authors have recently observed jury
selections where the following jurors were not removed for cause:
* a personal injury suit where the juror was currently a plaintiff in a
class action medical device product liability suit;
+ a race discrimination suit where the juror had been a plaintiff in a
discrimination suit based on religious preference;
+ a premises liability suit involving a violent crime where the juror
had once been the victim of a violent crime;
* a criminal case involving a woman battered by her husband where
the juror provided counseling to abused women;
16 See F. Gerald Kline et al., Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effect on Lmv School Mock Juries,
43 JOURNAmSM Q. 113, 116 (1966); Bruce Hoiberg & Lloyd K. Stires, The Effect of Several
Types of Pretrial Publicity on the Guilt Attributions of Simulated Jurors, 3 J. APPLIu Soc.
PSYCHOL. 267 (1973); Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, What's New in the News? The
Influence of Well-Published News Events on Psychological Research and Courtroom Trials, 5
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 211 (1984).
17 See Geoffrey Kramer & Norbert Kerr, Laboratory Simulation and Bias in the Study of
Juror Behavior, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1989).
18 See generally ICEK AxzEN & MARTIN FisHBEin, UNDERSTANDING A,-TrrruD AND PRE-
DICING SocIAL BEHAVIOR (1980); Russell Fazio & Mark P. Zanna, Direct Experience and
Attitude-Behavior Consistency, 14 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 161, 178-202
(1981).
19 See FED. R. Crv. PRoc. 47(b).
20 See Swap Shop v. Fortune, 365 S.W.2d 151, 152-54 (Tex. 1963) (in which a juror,
once the trial had begun, notified the court that he had just realized that the defendant was the
father-in-law of his close friend. The juror acknowledged a bias, yet was able to tell the court
that this connection would not affect his ability to render a fair verdict and therefore continued
to serve).
1997]
100 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
.* a premises liability case involving rape where the juror stated she
was inclined to make a large damages award because she was very
upset by rape.
21
All of the above jurors were able to be seated because they were
able to say to the court that they could be fair and impartial jurors when
dealing with the matter at trial. While such a statement clearly meets
standard legal burdens of fairness and ability to serve as a juror, the state-
ment fails psychological burdens of credibility.22 It is of note that such a
statement would generally not be considered adequate to rehabilitate a
judge or lawyer who had a conflict involving the matter at hand. It
would be clearly unacceptable for an officer of the court, who indicated a
conflict, or a strong appearance of a conflict, to continue as a significant
participant in the litigation simply because he or she made a statement
indicating that he or she could "set the conflict aside and be fair and
impartial."
Yet lay jurors are allowed to make such statements. With the ex-
ception of pecuniary interests and some degree of consanguinity to a
party, judges regularly allow jurors with the potential for bias to be
seated.23 The law fails to protect the parties of the litigation from this
bias because the basic psychology underlying juror bias is not understood
by court and counsel. Attorneys and judges with an understanding of the
psychology of challenges for cause will be better equipped to ensure the
selection of an unbiased jury.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
Thorough voir dire, covering details of the case and jurors' related
attitudes and experiences, is an important tool for uncovering bias. How-
ever, biased jurors will still be seated if they can be rehabilitated simply
by stating that they can be fair and impartial. A number of factors that
impact the court and counsel's ability to seat a fair and impartial jury by
relying on traditional voir dire24 and peremptory challenges are
presented below. From these factors it will be apparent that prospective
jurors' statements that they can be fair and impartial must be carefully
21 Case examples on file with authors.
22 Whether the prospective juror states that he or she can be fair and impartial because
the juror truly believes this to be true or because the juror is responding to pressure from the
judge or counsel is irrelevant. Such statements are, for all but exceptional jurors, contradicted
by the psychological research.
23 See e.g., ADAM NossrrER, OF LONG MEMORY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE MURDER OF
MEDGAR EVERS (1994); JAMES R. McGovaRN, ANATOMY OF A LYNCHING: THE KILLING OF
CLAUDE NEAL (1982).
24 See JtmywoRK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES (Elissa Krauss & Beth Bonora eds., 1996)




evaluated in light of their personal experiences and attitudes relevant to
the case at trial.
A. LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF OWN BIASES
Psychologists have long known that people often do not know what
affects their behavior, and are largely out of touch with their own cogni-
tive states.25 In a review of the research literature on human inference
and shortcomings in social judgment, Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross
found that judgments are often biased by attitudes.
26
Given that people are often unaware of the cognitive factors affect-
ing their biases, it would appear that jurors would be unqualified to
render an opinion as to their own ability to be fair. After all, they are
placed in a position where they are asked to perform a task with which
they are generally inexperienced, by following rules they have not yet
been given, while applying those rules to a set of facts yet unknown to
-them. The unique nature of jury service strongly suggests that prospec-
tive jurors may not be accurate judges of their own ability to set aside
experiences and attitudes in order to judge the facts of a case fairly and
impartially.
We are familiar with numerous examples where jurors' lack of
awareness of their own cognitive states rendered them biased, despite
their affirmation of their ability to be fair and impartial. In one case, for
example, involving a business dispute with a Japanese company as the
defendant, a juror stated that he felt absolutely no bias toward the Japa-
nese defendant.27 Counsel later learned that the juror would buy an
American-made product rather than a Japanese product, even if the Japa-
nese product was of higher quality and lower cost.28 The juror was sim-
ply unaware that he held attitudes about Japanese businesses that would
impact his ability to be fair and impartial in the trial of this matter.
B. LIMITATIONS OF SELF-REPORT OF POTENTIALLY BIASING
EXPERIENCES AND ATITrUDES
The dangers of relying on individuals' self-reports about their
thoughts and behaviors are well known.29 People often do not accurately
remember matters on which they are being asked to report. They may
not remember because they failed to store the event in memory, or be-
25 See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know:
Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 231 (1977).
26 RicHARD E. NiSBETT & LEE Ross, HumAN hmERENcE: STRATEGMS AND SHORTCOM-
INOS OF SocIAL JUDGMENT 7 (1980).
27 See text accompanying note 22.
28 See text accompanying note 22.
29 See Beth Azar, Poor Recall Mars Research and Treatment, 28 MONrrOR 1, 29 (1977).
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cause they stored it and are now unable to retrieve it, or the memory has
become distorted.30 The memory may, then, resurface when stimulated
by trial testimony and/or the deliberation process. 31 Individuals also do
not like to admit that they engage in undesirable actions, or report on
personal and sensitive issues such as drug use, spousal abuse or
abortions.
32
By nature, the voir dire process relies entirely on self-reports by
prospective jurors. The experiences and attitudes of jurors that might
lead to bias are often personal and sensitive, involving such things as
crime victimization, mental and physical health, prejudices regarding
various races, religions, national origins, genders and sexual orientations,
bankruptcy and other financial experiences, drug use, abortions, family
tragedies, just to name a few. It is naive, at best, to accept jurors' claims
that they can be fair and impartial in cases where their self-report of
attitudes and experiences indicates a potential for bias.
C. SOCIAL DESIRABmrrY RESPONSES
During voir dire prospective jurors do not want to answer questions
in a manner which they perceive to be socially undesirable.33 Douglas
Crowne and David Marlow have labeled this "social desirability," and
have studied how people seek approval through giving socially desirable
responses. 34 Many authors have noted that prospective jurors perceive
admitting to bias to be socially undesirable.
35
If some jurors hold attitudes that are prejudicial to one of the par-
ties, yet believe that they will be seen as socially undesirable if they
admit to being prejudiced, then some subset of those prejudiced jurors
will state that they can be fair and impartial in order to obtain approval
from the judge, counsel, or other jurors. Obviously, seating such a juror
will result in a biased jury.
D. SOCIAL PRESSURE TO CONFORM
Similar to social desirability, many prospective jurors will not want
to appear to be deviant in any way from their fellow jurors or what they
30 See id. at 1.
31 See generally Charles L. Gruder et al., Empirical Tests of the Absolute Sleeper Effect
Predicted From the Discounting Cue Hypothesis, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1061
(1978).
32 See Charles F. Cannell & Robert L. Kahn, Interviewing, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 526-95 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1968).
33 See DOUGLAS P. CROWNE & DAVID MARLowE, THE APPROVAL MOTrE: STUDIES IN
EVALUATIVE DEPENDENCE 13 (1964).
34 Id. at 13.
35 See generally David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire:
A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245 (1980).
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believe to be the attitudes of their fellow jurors.36 Research has shown
that conformity is motivated by emotional rewards and punishments.3
7
Conformity leads to feelings of pride, while non-conformity leads to
feelings of shame.38 Jurors will certainly want to avoid the "shame" of
expressing bias, and therefore be deviant when other jurors state that they
can be fair and impartial. Pride can be obtained by denying bias and
conforming to the stereotypical role of the fair juror.
The pressure to conform is especially high when it is perceived as
coming from high status individuals.39 In the courtroom, the judge is
perceived by jurors as a very high status person. If the judge conveys
pressure to conform by declaring fairness and impartiality, it would be
likely that many biased jurors would make such a declaration. It is com-
mon for judges to lecture prospective jurors on their duty to be fair and
impartial, and their legal requirement to set aside any personal beliefs
and follow the law as given to them by the judge.40
E. LYING
There is ample evidence that some prospective jurors will lie while
answering questions during voir dire, despite being under oath. Linda
Marshall conducted a study, funded by the National Institute of Justice,
of actual jurors from criminal trials and found that almost one in five
(18%) withheld information during questioning.41 Dale Broeder con-
ducted an empirical study of voir dire in twenty-three trials.42 He con-
cluded that jurors often lie during voir dire and noted that voir dire was
not effective in revealing juror biases.43
There is no way of knowing if jurors are lying when they tell the
court that they can be fair and impartial. However, if the juror has previ-
ously reported experiences or attitudes that predispose him or her to bias
36 See Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 Sci. AM. 31, 36 (1955) (for
seminal social psychological research on how social pressure leads to conformity in expressed
opinions).
37 See Thomas J. Scheff, Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System, 53
AM. Soc. RFv. 395, 396 (1988).
38 See id. at 400.
39 See Serge Moscovici, Social Influence and Conformity, in 6 THm HANDBOOK OF So-
ci a. PSYCHOLOGY 347 (Lindzey et al., 3rd ed. 1985).
40 Moscovici makes an important distinction between "conversion" and "compliance."
Id. In conversion, the juror will change an opinion in order to conform. See id. In compli-
ance, the juror will state that he or she can be fair and impartial in order to comply.with the
conformity pressure from the judge, but will still retain his or her private opinion. See id.
41 Linda L. Marshall, Juror, Judge, and Counsel Voir Dire Perceptions and Behavior in
Two Illinois State Courts, (1983) (unpublished partial Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University)
(on file with author).
42 Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV.
503 (1965).
43 Id. at 528.
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in the case at trial, the potentially prejudiced party can have little confi-
dence in the juror's statement of fairness, and can only be assured of an
impartial jury if a challenge for cause is granted.
F. PERSEVERANCE OF BELIEFS
It is well accepted by psychologists that biases affect reasoning.
44
Significantly, psychologists have also studied how biases persevere in
the face of contradictory evidence. Peter Ditto found that less informa-
tion is needed to reach a preferred conclusion because information con-
sistent with that conclusion is examined less critically than is inconsistent
information.
45
If jurors hold biases about a party or an issue at trial, there is the
possibility that they will simply reject testimony or evidence that is con-
tradictory to their biases.46 The effect of bias on information processing
is potentially so strong that studies have shown that contradictory infor-
mation (including evidence and testimony) can actually be interpreted to
support one's prior attitude. 47
In light of this research, we cannot reasonably expect that all jurors
who hold biased attitudes relevant to the case at trial will be able to be
fair and impartial simply because they have stated that they can. Instead,
we should expect that, unless those jurors are excluded for cause, some
of them will persevere in their biased beliefs, and cognitively process
trial testimony in a manner that is prejudicial to one of the parties.
G. JUDICIAL INSTRUCTION TO SET BIASES ASIDE
Again, we cannot reasonably expect jurors to be able to set aside
their biases simply because a judge instructs them to do so. Consider a
juror who expresses a prejudicial attitude, and then accedes to the judge's
instructions by stating that he or she will set his or her attitude aside so to
be fair and impartial in this case. David Wegner and his associates have
found that asking an individual to not think about something causes an
active cognitive search to see whether that thought is present.4 8 This has
the paradoxical effect of making the thought more cognitively accessi-
ble.4 9 Thus, the juror who is told to not think about a bias will find that
bias to be even more accessible in his or her processing of the trial testi-
mony and evidence.
44 See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480
(1990).
45 Ditto & Lopez, supra note 13, at 568.
46 See Ross et al., supra note 10, at 889.
47 See Lord et al., supra note 11, at 2099.
48 David M. Wegner & Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts, 63
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 903 (1992).
49 See id. at 907.
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The inability of jurors to set aside or disregard information has been
well studied in areas such as pre-trial publicity,50 inadmissible evi-
dence,51 limiting uses of evidence,5 2 and severance.5 3 Given all of the
psychological factors discussed above, we should not expect jurors to be
able to set aside biases simply because of judicial instruction to do so.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that peremptory challenges are not the answer to po-
tential juror bias. Often times, there are an insufficient number of per-
emptory challenges available to remove all potentially biased jurors.
When a plaintiff's final peremptory challenge is exercised, and a replace-
ment juror is seated, a challenge for cause is the only remedy available if
the replacement juror is biased.
Yet, that remedy is not available to the prejudiced party if the juror
states despite having reported experiences or attitudes that psychological
research literature would indicate can lead directly to bias that he or she
can put any bias aside, and be fair and impartial.
To ensure fair and impartial juries, juries wit& no appearance of
prejudice, judges must liberally grant challenges for cause. If judges
come to know that (1) jurors' experiences and attitudes can cause biased
reasoning, (2) testimony and evidence will be interpreted to favor a bi-
ased perception, (3) jurors' self-reports of fairness are often not credible,
and (4) judicial instruction does not solve the problem, then they should
grant challenges for cause as the rule, rather than the exception in cases
of apparent bias.
50 See Carroll et al., supra note 15, at 195. Note that the prejudicial effects of pre-trial
publicity endured, despite judicial instructions.
51 See Dale Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. Ray. 744,756-
61 (1958) (finding that limiting instruction was an inadequate remedy for jurors' use of inad-
missible evidence); Thomas R. Carretta & Richard Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects
of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLmD Soc. PSYCHOL. 291 (1983).
52 See Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The Impact of
Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 Soc. BEHAv. 165, 173-78
(1987) (finding that jurors used impeachment evidence for liability purposes despite limiting
judicial instructions); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence
and Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & Hum. BEHAv.
477, 483-86 (1988); see also Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of
Limiting Instructions: When Jurors use Credibility Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw &
Hum. BmEAv. 37, 43-47 (1985) (concluding that evidence of prior convictions affects verdicts
despite limiting instructions).
53 See Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, When Crimes are Joined at Trial: Institu-
tionalized Prejudice?, 9 LAW & HUM. BEaHAv. 193, 201 (1985); Sarah Tanford & Steven Pen-
rod, Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with Multiple Offenses, 12 J. APPLmD
Soc. PSYCHOL. 453, 461 (1982) (finding that despite judicial instructions to consider charges
separately, when crimes were joined, convictions increased).
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A fair and impartial trial by jury can only be ensured by removing,
for cause, prospective jurors who have experiences or attitudes that indi-
cate a significant potential for prejudice in the matter at trial. Accepting
such jurors' statements, that they can set aside their biases and be fair,
creates the great risk of seating biased jurors, and a clear appearance of
prejudice to a party.
